Fordham Law Review Online
Volume 88

Article 17

2019

Visions of the Republic Symposium: School Funding Under the
Neutrality Principle: Notes on a Post-Espinoza Future
Aaron Saiger
Fordham University School of Law, nstewart14@law.fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flro
Part of the Education Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court of the
United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Saiger, Aaron (2019) "Visions of the Republic Symposium: School Funding Under the Neutrality Principle:
Notes on a Post-Espinoza Future," Fordham Law Review Online: Vol. 88 , Article 17.
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flro/vol88/iss1/17

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review Online by an authorized editor of FLASH:
The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

SCHOOL FUNDING UNDER THE NEUTRALITY
PRINCIPLE: NOTES ON A POST-ESPINOZA
FUTURE
Aaron Saiger*
Once again, school choice is on the docket at the U.S. Supreme Court. The
case, Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue,1 involves a tax credit enacted
in Montana. The credit is provided to individuals who make donations to
scholarship organizations that subvent student tuition at private schools,
including religious schools.2 The Montana Supreme Court set aside the
program,3 holding that, given the constraints of the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, the program could not be made compatible with the
provision in the Montana constitution that prohibits legislative “direct or
indirect appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies . . . for any
sectarian purpose or to aid any church [or] school . . . controlled in whole or
in part by any church, sect, or denomination.”4 Plaintiffs argue that, if that
is the case, then the Montana constitutional provision itself violates the First
Amendment. The grant of certiorari rested, one may reasonably surmise,
upon the fact that a majority of states have constitutional provisions, known
as “Blaine Amendments,” similar to Montana’s.
Its direct challenge to the Blaine Amendments makes Espinoza a
blockbuster case. Espinoza is also a direct successor of the Supreme Court’s
2002 decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,5 in which the Court upheld a
school voucher program. Both cases concern programs that direct public
money (or money that, but for its tax treatment, would have been public
money) to offset tuition in private schools, including religious schools.6
Parental decisions, rather than government budgets or contracts, determine
which private schools benefit from those funds. In Zelman, the Court was
asked to decide whether the First Amendment permits states to include
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to several colleagues
for their incisive comments. I also thank the members of my Fall 2019 Education Law
seminar, who always pushed back, and my student Nora Stewart, who determinedly
shepherded this Essay from idea to final publication under severely suboptimal conditions.
1. No. 18-1195 (U.S. argued Jan. 2, 2020).
2. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-30-3101–3114 (2020).
3. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 614 (Mont. 2018), cert. granted,
139 S. Ct. 2777 (2019).
4. MONT. CONST. art. 10, § 6, cl. 1.
5. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
6. See generally id.
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religious schools among the private schools eligible to receive such funds.
The Court held, subject to several provisos, that it does. Eighteen years later,
in Espinoza, the Court is considering whether the First Amendment requires
a state with such a program to permit religious schools to receive program
funds on the same basis as any other private school.
Espinoza, as Zelman did before it, has two discrete policy communities on
edge, both oscillating between excitement and dread.7 The first community
cares about religion. Disputants offer competing visions of the proper
relationship between religion and the public sphere. The second community
wars over educational markets. Its organizing question is whether public
schooling should be organized as a set of local public monopolies, as has
been traditional, or whether multiple schools ought to be allowed to enter
local markets and compete with one another. Although these two issues
seem, at least on the conceptual level, to be discrete, Espinoza has galvanized
both policy communities, each viewing the case to be a potentially
momentous turning point.8
But that discreteness is ultimately illusory. At their deepest level, debates
over church and state on one hand and over market competition in schooling
on the other both ask how the state should involve itself in people’s decisions
about how, fundamentally, it is best to view the world. And American
constitutionalism approaches this issue fundamentally differently, and
inconsistently, pursuant to the church/state frame than it does under the
school-choice frame. The guarantee of religious freedom is understood to
require government to abstain as people formulate many aspects of their
fundamental world view. But the Progressive imperative of “common
schooling,” which is the small-c constitution of American public education
(and an explicit constitutional requirement in some states), takes exactly the
opposite view. Common schooling requires people to come together,
through the institutions of popular sovereignty, to define a worldview and
then build schools that will inculcate it in all children, so that, ultimately,
values will be widely shared across the polity. Religious freedom is pluralist.
Common schools are communitarian. Religious freedom requires the state
to be agnostic about the nature of the good. Common schooling insists that
the state take a stand.
By bringing these two frames together, Espinoza is the harbinger of
possible, future, direct conflict between them. Under the principle that
government may not privilege irreligion over religion, one might ask why
public, common education, which the Court has held must be secular, can
enjoy public subsidies not available (in size or kind) to religious education.
Espinoza and Zelman by no means ask that question. Indeed, they are

7. Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools, 48
B.C. L. REV. 909, 946–47 (2007).
8. See Emma Green, Your Neighbor’s Christian Education, Courtesy of Your Tax
Dollars, ATLANTIC (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/10/
supreme-court-private-schools/599956/ [https://perma.cc/M8TL-QY8N] (summarizing
expectations of various groups).
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carefully framed not to suggest that the special status of public education
might violate the First Amendment. But the question awaits. It took eighteen
years to get from Zelman’s “may” to Espinoza’s “must.” Perhaps in another
eighteen, a case may ask whether common schools, both free and secular, can
receive public funds only when they are simply players in a market,
competing on equal terms with all other schools.
If the Court, and the country, get to that question, it is hard to be sure which
view will prevail. Based on current conditions, and for a variety of reasons,
the best guess—and it is only a guess—is that common schooling might be
forced to give way before a rigorously read First Amendment duty of the
state to avoid preferring irreligion over religion. This need not signal the end
of the Progressive educational vision, however. It will be possible for those
committed to the values inherent in common schooling to regroup,
reconsidering some of their positions in order to advance their core
commitments.
I. CHOICE VERSUS THE COMMON SCHOOL
90 percent of American students attend public schools,9 which are funded
by the state and charge no tuition. The parents of the remaining 10 percent,
exercising their constitutional right to reject public schooling in favor of
private alternatives, send their children to schools that receive only negligible
state funding and (with rare exceptions) do charge tuition. A number of states
now use public funds to offset the tuition costs of families who exercise this
right. States’ arrangements take a variety of institutional forms, including
vouchers, tax credits, and education savings accounts.10 All of these
arrangements share a fundamental design. They direct public money to
private schools—but which particular private schools receive funds depends
on families’, not governments’, choices.
Espinoza, along with Zelman and several other cases that have been
decided during the decades that separate the two, are framed only as
applications of First Amendment principles to those subsidies, given that
some recipient schools may be religious.11 The cases thus seem to say
nothing about the funding or management of the public schools that educate
90 percent of American schoolchildren free of charge.
None of this is remarkable. Education is not the only or the most important
sector in which religious providers participate and in which the government
subsidizes private purchases of privately produced goods in order to further
the public interest. Obvious examples include vouchers for food purchased
9. See Private Elementary and Secondary School Enrollment and Private Enrollment as
a Percentage of Total Enrollment in Public and Private Schools, by Region and Grade Level:
Selected Years, Fall 1995 Through Fall 2015, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17_205.10.asp
[https://perma.cc/2ACZDRRE] (2015 data).
10. Julie F. Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling:
Examining Voucher Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 703, 706 (2015).
11. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011).
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by the poor and tax credits for health insurance purchased by the employed.
Moreover, such programs can operate in parallel with in-kind provision of
similar services by the state. A state that partially subsidizes private schools
even as it provides free public schooling on request is similar to a government
that provides food stamps12 while also purchasing and directly distributing
foods to needy consumers,13 or a nation that provides tax subsidies to
purchases of private health insurance,14 even as it also directly insures
persons through Medicaid or Medicare Part A.15
This is not to say, of course, that subsidies in a private market have no
impact on the parallel public sector. Every market subsidy affects markets
for substitute goods, including goods publicly provided. Government
provision of agricultural surplus goods to schools affects how food stamps
are used. That premiums for employer-provided health insurance are not
taxed affects demand (and prices) for both Medicare and insurance provided
on the open market. Educational subsidies likewise depress demand for
publicly provided education, as any subsidy must.
Briefs and judicial opinions in cases like Espinoza and Zelman—cases that
ask whether and how religious schools may be included among private
schools receiving public funds—generally treat these substitution effects as
marginal, just as they would if the subsidies at issue were destined for kosher
grocery stores or Catholic hospitals. Substitution effects enter the analysis
where relevant, but the focus is on the place of religion in the semisubsidized, private sector of the industry. It is assumed that the public
sector—public schools—will continue to provide services directly, using
only public monies, with no financial transaction whatsoever involving
students’ families.
In the broader legal, political, and popular conversations regarding
government subsidy for school choice, however, subsidies for private school
tuition have for decades been framed as frontal attacks upon the institution
of the public school. This framing is quite different from that applied to food
aid, hospitals, or other state efforts to subsidize the private side of a market
that includes both government and private providers. And it is a framing
equally prevalent among educational subsidies’ detractors and their
proponents. On the mainstream and Democratic left, the public school is an
embattled institution that needs defending against rapacious “neoliberals.”16
12. See 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (2018).
13. See 7 C.F.R. § 250.1 (2020) (stating that food purchased by the Department of
Agriculture is then donated to consumers pursuant to various federal statutes).
14. See I.R.C. § 106(a) (2020).
15. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.201 (2020).
16. “Neoliberal” is a perfectly good word, denoting a preference for market-based policies
over government provision of services. See David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy,
Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 1, 1–3.
But the term’s adoption by its academic and political opponents as a self-explanatory synonym
for “contemptible,” and its concomitant abandonment by those sympathetic to it, have ruined
it for descriptive use. See id. at 1–3, 6. For a failed attempt to rescue the term in the context
of schools shorn of emotional valence, see Aaron Saiger, Charter Schools, the Establishment
Clause, and the Neoliberal Turn in Public Education, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2013).
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On the religious and libertarian right, the “government school” is a sclerotic
beast long past its usefulness, ripe for tearing down. Only recently, as
“Medicare for All” proposals have entered public discourse, have we seen
comparable levels of emotion and binary thinking in other sectors where state
subsidy is important.17
These reactions seem disproportionate and overwrought in both legal and
economic terms. Why, then, do they take up so much space in the dialogue
over this issue? Among several possible explanations, the most basic is that
the debate over educational choice is a deeply ideological one. The
government that subsidizes your food purchases is entirely indifferent to
whether you do your grocery shopping at government-run or private
groceries. Proposals for a public health care option (though not for singlepayer insurance) seek a health-care system that leaves it up to patients
whether they prefer public or private insurance, without imposing a
preference as to which they choose. But, for many, the government that
subsidizes public education necessarily must provide it in a publicly run and
publicly governed institution.
This commitment can be clearly traced to the project initiated by Horace
Mann and his colleagues in the antebellum period. Mann sought to replace
a system of haphazard, hyperlocal, and privatized institutions with a system
of common schools. Common schools would be experienced by rich and
poor, Congregationalist and Calvinist, native and immigrant, alike.
Common-ness, Mann thought, was critical to a functioning polity.
Furthermore, it was essential in a period when class differences loomed large,
immigration was surging, and the diversity of the nation changing—all
features shared by Mann’s age and our own.18 Common-school reformers
were explicit that their project was motivated in substantial part by a desire
to detach immigrant children from the culture and politics (and religions) of
their families and instill in them opinions and attitudes more “American.”
The common school thus was designed to mitigate parental preferences about
their children’s education in favor of a state orthodoxy.19
As the idea that education was not only a public good but a tool to achieve
desirable political homogenization penetrated the United States, it became
17. Compare Medicare for All Is a Meaningless Slogan, ECONOMIST (Oct. 13, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/10/13/medicare-for-all-is-a-meaningless-slogan
[https://perma.cc/DTV3-CGHE], and Reihan Salam, “Medicare for All” Is a Fantasy,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/medicare-forall-is-a-fantasy/568957/ [https://perma.cc/23X4-HXBM], with Meagan Day & Bhaskar
Sunkara, Opinion, Why America Needs Medicare for All, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/opinion/medicare-for-all-health-costs.html
[https://perma.cc/6KAJ-YU4Z].
18. A committee of the National Education Association wrote in 1919 that the purpose of
education is to “insure the acquisition of those habits, skills, knowledge, ideals, and prejudices
which must be made the common property of all, that each may be an efficient member of a
progressive democratic society.” LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876–1957, at 193 (1964).
19. See Aaron Saiger, Deconstitutionalizing Dewey, 13 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 765, 785
(2019).

218

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 88

entangled with various other principles that we now associate with the
Progressive era. The emphasis on the nonsectarian nature of the public
schools became more emphatic. A particular compromise between
democracy and elitism, in which public schools would be governed by locally
and democratically elected boards, but with a strong de facto noöcratic
presumption of deference to self-styled “experts,” became the norm.
Pedagogically, public schools were to function in important respects as
miniature democratic communities, so that students could learn citizenship
experientially. All of these principles both rely and expand upon the idea of
the public school as a common, standardizing, homogenizing, and statecentered enterprise.20
In the 1920s, as the diffusion of Progressive schooling progressed, the
Lochnerian Supreme Court tapped the brakes. In a series of cases it set aside
various state efforts, motivated by various forms of nativism and antiCatholic sentiment, to prohibit or onerously regulate private schooling.21
The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit states to seek
Compulsory education was
entirely to “standardize” children.22
constitutional but compulsory public education was not.
These cases made clear, however, that parents who chose to exit the public
schools were obligated not only to find a private substitute but to pay for it
themselves. This created an enormous financial incentive to use the public
schools.23 As a result, a private sector grew up alongside the Progressive
public schools, but the latter dominated the field. The private sector,
moreover, was dominated by religious schools, where parents might be
thought to be especially willing to pay and where philanthropy as well as
tuition was available to support the effort. In the subsidized public schools,
meanwhile, the common-school and Progressive paradigms saw enormous
success. They were widely adopted by World War I. By the middle of the
century, they were hegemonic, the small-c constitution of American public
schooling. Indeed, many states explicitly included the word “common” in
the education clause of their constitutions.24
This explains why advocacy for school choice is understood, on both sides,
as an attack on the very idea of public schools. The common school views
the private sector as a grudging concession, and the cost advantage of public
education as one of that concession’s most important mitigators. School
20. In a recent op-ed on Espinoza, Sarah Vowell wrote, “The public schools the framers
[of the Montana constitution] conjured ask the taxpayers to splurge on fairness, not privilege,
to pull together, not away.” Sarah Vowell, Opinion, The Supreme Court Could Upend This
State’s Schools Over $150, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/
18/opinion/supreme-court-school-choice.html [https://perma.cc/H5X8-32JL].
21. See generally Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
22. This conclusion was founded squarely in Lochner-era ideas of freedom of contract.
But these holdings have survived the repudiation of Lochner, having been recast as questions
of parental liberty to raise children as they like.
23. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Using Private Schools to Promote Public Values, 1 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 171, 181 (1991).
24. See Saiger, supra note 7, at 932 & n.138 (2007).
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choice, on the other hand, finds no virtue in common-ness. The genius of the
market is that it can accommodate diverse preferences without government
intervention. One needs a free (and fairly subsidized) market in order to
generate a diverse population of schools, with different approaches,
philosophies, and curricula, that responds to consumer demand. A system
that revolves around democracy, expert control, and homogenization is
inimical to one that centers the sovereign consumer. And a school system
that relies upon consumer sovereignty is exactly the opposite of a system of
common schools.
One can think of unfairness, or discrimination, in terms of markets or of
democracy. From a market point of view, it is hard reasonably to deny that
the common school is unfair, or even, perhaps, discriminatory. Parents
whose politics and culture are in the mainstream generally find their
preferences satisfied by the common school; those with atypical backgrounds
or dissident views generally do not. To say that the former can have the
schools they want for free, whereas the latter must arrange for and pay for
the schools that they want, is not “fair.”
On the other hand, even though public schools are local monopolies, the
single free-of-charge option is available to everyone. What those schools are
like and how they are funded is determined through democratic decisionmaking. If the polity’s procedures for reaching decisions are fair, then this
arrangement is politically “fair.”
It is a hallmark of the success of Progressivism that political fairness, not
consumer fairness, was for so long the unquestioned basis of school
governance. This posture is deeply tied to the Progressive view that schools’
task is to form future citizens, which centers democratic decision-making as
a fair procedure. But the political account of fairness is no longer absolutely
dominant. This is due, in no small part, to the ways in which the democratic
procedures of contemporary school governance are deeply unfair, due mostly
to hyperlocalism inflected by race.25 Even setting procedural unfairness
aside, however, some school choice advocacy directly critiques the
Progressive idea of political fairness. In our contemporary moment, they
argue, commonality is no longer and should no longer be our governing
value. Even in politics, we should be committed to diversity, to formal
fairness to individuals, to the idea that there is no one single idea of the good.
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM VERSUS THE COMMON SCHOOL
These latter claims—that markets are fairer, and in particular more tolerant
of dissidence, than politics—resonate in American First Amendment
constitutionalism. The principles of both nonestablishment and of free
exercise are about protecting the opinions of the few from the potential
tyranny of the many. With respect to religion, there is no question in
American law that what I have called consumer fairness, not democratic
fairness, is the kind of fairness we seek. The religious views of the
25. See infra Part III.
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individual, however divergent from the norm, are entitled to equal treatment
as against dominant views. The guarantee of free exercise means that
individuals get to choose whether, how, and with which kind of religion they
wish to affiliate, and that the state must keep its hands off those choices. That
word choose makes the First Amendment friendly to claims about markets,
which are based on choice, and unfriendly to claims that people should be
treated the same and their political and social opinions standardized.
This—along with the fact the private-school sector is predominantly
religious, with religious schools enrolling more than 80 percent of all private
schools—has drawn pro-market, anti-Progressive ideologues to the First
Amendment like moths to a flame. The complainants in Espinoza, as in
Zelman before it, insist upon a consumer view of unfairness. However far a
religious school may be from the mainstream, in matters of religion, that
distance cannot be allowed to matter. In particular, the principle that the state
cannot prefer irreligion to religion means that it cannot have an opinion as to
whether religious education is better or worse than secular education.26
Common schooling, of course, is all about the state having an opinion.
By framing their cases as cases about religion—and by litigating in federal
court, under a federal constitution that is understood to grant no educational
rights—school choice has elevated the market frame to the center of the
choice debate.
If we understand the First Amendment framing as elevating a kind of
choice foreign to the idea of the common school, Espinoza can be seen,
potentially, as midwifing a tremendous paradigm shift in American
education. It took nearly two decades to arrive at Espinoza’s “must” from
Zelman’s “may.” What seeds might Espinoza plant that could flower several
decades from now?
During oral argument in Espinoza, Justice Breyer imagined one such
flowering. He asked the lawyer for the complainants whether a state’s
decision to fund its secular public schools might trigger a duty to fund
religious schools as well, under a First Amendment principle of
nondiscrimination against religion:
What [do] you think of this? . . . Say in San Francisco or Boston or take
any city or state, and they give many, many, many millions of dollars to the
26. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“The First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion.”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“[T]he
State may not establish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or
showing hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who believe in no religion over those who
do believe.’” (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)); Douglas Laycock,
Formal, Substantive and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993,
1001 (1990) (“[T]he religion clauses require government to minimize the extent to which it
either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice,
observance or nonobservance.”); see also Christopher B. Harwood, Evaluating the Supreme
Court’s Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in the Wake of Van Orden v. Perry and
McCreary County v. ACLU, 71 MO. L. REV. 317, 339 (2006) (“The neutrality principle calls
for government to remain nonaligned with respect to religion—that is, government must not
favor one religion over another, religion over secularism, or secularism over religion.”).
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public school system. And a lot of them give a lot of money to charter
schools. Now, they don’t give money to Catholic schools. All right? Now,
if—if we decide you’re [i.e., the complainants are] right, does that all
change?
. . . I’m not talking about scholarships. . . . I’m talking about the X billion
dollars that the State of New York spends on the public school system, and
I don’t know how much, but I suspect they might spend money on charter
schools. . . . If I decide for you, am I saying that they have to give money
to the—same amounts proportionate to—to the parochial school?27

When complainant’s counsel responded as if Justice Breyer was asking
about the structure of state funding across different types of private schools,
the justice tried again:
Oh, oh, what’s the private? Why is it that they [i.e., state subsidies] have
to be equal with private [i.e., equal for both religious and secular private
schools] but they [i.e., the subsidies given to religious schools] don’t have
to be equal with [those given to] public [schools]? . . . My hypothetical was
they give it out in—it’s called the Public School System of the United
States. I’m saying that’s what I’m talking about. Now, what’s your
response? What’s the difference between this case, you win, and the same
with the public schools, they have to give it to parochial schools too.
What’s the difference?28

Once again, the attorney ducked Breyer’s question. He either did not
understand it or pretended that he did not. When Justice Kagan changed the
subject, Breyer gave up.
What Justice Breyer wanted to know is: might providing public education
at all, given that it must be secular under the Establishment Clause, trigger a
state duty to proportionally fund private religious education, lest it violate the
principle that states may not favor irreligion over religion?29
Breyer’s question is not only incisive but resonates particularly in the
context of Espinoza. The Espinoza complainants make a supremacy-clause
argument, arguing that a state constitutional provision, the Blaine
Amendment, must yield to the federal First Amendment. The Montana
Supreme Court acknowledged that supremacy problem but sought to
reconcile the two by disallowing tax credits that support any private
scholarships, religious or not.30 The court thus sought to avoid religious
discrimination by cementing the special advantages of the public school
system, which is secular. The complainants argue that this is unacceptable

27. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24–26, Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 181195 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2020) [hereinafter Espinoza Transcript]; cf. Mead, supra note 10, at 704
(noting a colloquy with Justice Nancy Rice of the Colorado Supreme Court similar to the one
described here).
28. Espinoza Transcript, supra note 27, at 26–27.
29. See supra note 26.
30. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 615 (Mont. 2018), cert. granted,
139 S. Ct. 2777 (2019).
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because a retreat to secularism constitutes discrimination against “religion in
general,” and is therefore unconstitutional.31
Breyer’s hypothetical tracks the structure of this argument precisely. The
duty to provide public schooling is imposed by state constitutions.32 The
First Amendment requires that schooling be secular. But that secularism in
publicly provided schools is necessary does not obviate the possibility of
unconstitutional discrimination against “religion in general.”33 And this
possibility raises Breyer’s extraordinary question. Is the public school as we
know it, free, common, secular, and governmentally (expertly) run—is that
school, whatever its failings, still a pillar of the republic?34 Can the public
articulate the values of society and educate all its students in those values,
permitting exit, to be sure, but only partially35 and while triggering a
substantial additional financial burden?
This question is so far out of the mainstream that it seems almost fanciful.
Even among school choice advocates, it is rare to hear that equal funding
should be provided to all schools, including public schools, on precisely the
same terms. Among choice opponents, energy has focused on building new
arguments that would enlarge the special status of public schools, given state
constitutional requirements, as against other kinds of schools.36 The
Supreme Court itself, not very long ago in Locke v. Davey,37 blessed a
decision to make students in religious graduate programs ineligible for a
secular scholarship program, finding that this sort of preference for
secularism reflected no “animus toward religion” and citing the “play in the
31. Brief for Petitioners at 14–16, Espinoza v. Mon. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 18-1195 (U.S.
Sept. 11, 2019) (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 532 (1993)).
32. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Preferencing Educational Choice: The Constitutional
Limits, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1403 (2018). Breyer’s reference to the “Public School
System of the United States,” Espinoza Transcript, supra note 27, at 27, is of course legally
imprecise, as the justice would surely concede. Each state has, under its own constitution, a
duty to establish its own “Public School System.” See also supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
33. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
34. Cf. CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY, 1780–1860 (1983).
35. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S 390, 402 (1923) (“The power of the State to compel
attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a
requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not questioned.”); id. at 401 (“That
the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens,
physically, mentally and morally, is clear.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925) (“No question is raised concerning the power of the State . . . to require that . . .
[nonpublic school] teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that
certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught
which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.”); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178
(1976) (“[W]hile parents have a constitutional right to send their children to private
schools . . . they have no constitutional right to provide their children with private school
education unfettered by reasonable government regulation.”).
36. See Black, supra note 32, at 1363–64; Derek W. Black, The Constitutional
Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L. REV. 735, 746 (2018); Goodwin Liu,
Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 334–35 (2006).
37. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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joints” between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.38 And the
mere fact that the question came from Justice Breyer, who is “legendary for
asking absurd hypothetical questions,” might lead one to discount it further.39
I am not suggesting here that the special status of public schools is
unconstitutional, or that the Supreme Court is poised to declare it to be
unconstitutional in the short term. I mean to suggest only that Breyer’s
hypothetical is far from “absurd.” It is consistent with trends in American
constitutional law, which Espinoza tees up. Why is it unconstitutional to
treat private religious schools differently from secular private schools, but
still constitutional to treat them differently from secular public schools?
The recent Trinity Lutheran decision holds that churches may not be
excluded from participating on equal terms in a “government benefit program
without having to disavow its religious character.”40 It is not that large a
stretch, especially with the advent of student-based budgeting methods for
allocating public school funds,41 to treat education funding as “a government
benefit program.” Already, several scholars have wondered about the
constitutionality of state statutes that make religious schools ineligible for
charter-school status.42 Among them, Professor Stephen Sugarman has
argued forcefully that the religious charter exclusion is unconstitutional,
precisely because it prefers irreligion to religion.43
In 2020, in short, Breyer’s hypothetical has coherence. The First
Amendment does prohibit public programs that discriminate because of
religion. This includes discrimination against religion. When a state chooses
not only to fund but to manage free, public schools, which are secular,
perhaps that does trigger a duty to treat religious schools the same, and fund
them proportionately. That the Establishment Clause demands that religious
schools exist only in the private sector, and that the Fourteenth Amendment
liberty guarantee demands that they not be forced into secular schools, does
not change this duty.
The avulsive character of this question naturally led complainants’
attorney in Espinoza to insist that he sought only equity within the private

38. Id. at 719, 725. The program excluded in Davey was a graduate theology program
with no secular content, and so the case can be read narrowly not to apply to religious K–12
schools that provide both secular and religious instruction. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Is It
Unconstitutional to Prohibit Faith-Based Schools from Becoming Charter Schools?, 32 J.L.
& RELIGION 227, 257–58 (2017).
39. Lisa S. Blatt, In Front of the Burgundy Curtain: The Top Ten Lessons I’ve Learned
About Advocacy Before the Nation’s Highest Court, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 9, 17 (2010).
40. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2017).
Sugarman suggests that the treatment of Davey in Trinity Lutheran suggests that Davey no
longer enjoys support on the sitting Supreme Court. See Sugarman, supra note 38, at 260.
41. See Ellen Foley, Equity and Student-Based Budgeting, VOICES URB. EDUC., Fall 2010,
at 6, 11 (defining student-based budgeting as “formulas which allocate actual dollars directly
to schools on the basis of both the number of students enrolled and weights assigned to various
categories of students”).
42. See Sugarman, supra note 38, at 288 n.2 (providing a more extensive literature
review). See generally Saiger, supra note 16.
43. Sugarman, supra note 38, at 260.
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sector, not between private schools and public ones.44 But the intuition that
religious-school pupils deserve the same level of subsidy for their educations
as other pupils resonates with contemporary First Amendment thinking. In
2020, it still seems a bridge too far; but Espinoza would have seemed
similarly overambitious when Zelman was decided in 2002. Perhaps Breyer
has outlined the core claims of the big school-choice case a few decades
down the road.
III. A VISION OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLING IN A PLURALIST
CONTEXT
Suppose we were to find ourselves, some decades hence, in a world—I
emphasize again, this is not our world in 2020, but it is a plausible future—
when the twin First Amendment commands that (a) the state not privilege
irreligion over religion, and (b) state schools themselves can have no
religion—might be thought to demand public funding of religious schools, at
levels equal to funding for public schools. What would that world hold for
those committed to common schooling? They will continue to think that a
vital democratic education is one, as Horace Mann put it, that is “free,
financed by local and state government, controlled by lay boards of
education, mixing all social groups under one roof, and offering education of
such quality that no parent would desire private schooling.”45 To this list
might be added the Progressive values that schools should instill “American”
values in all children, and that going to school should be practice for
citizenship.46 Would such persons find their vision finally extinguished by
the neoliberal apocalypse that had been predicted, but failed to materialize,
in the wake of Zelman and Espinoza?47 Not necessarily. Common-schoolers
could act to maintain their educational commitments even if a strong version
of First Amendment nondiscrimination insisted upon treating religious and
government-run schools with parity.
Three strategies suggest themselves. They will not maintain everything
valuable about the common-school vision of the Progressives, but they will
help to preserve most of its most important features.
1. Practice what you preach. There can be no question that the greatest
challenge to the viability of the common-school paradigm is not market
competition but the overwhelming extent to which we have permitted the
44. Espinoza Transcript, supra note 27, at 25–27.
45. DAVID TYACK & ELISABETH HANSOT, MANAGERS OF VIRTUE: PUBLIC SCHOOL
LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, 1820–1980, at 30 (1982); accord Diane Ravitch, Education and
Democracy, in MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY 15, 15 (Diane
Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2001).
46. See Emily Buss, Developmental Jurisprudence, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 741, 758 (2016);
Saiger, supra note 19, at 780–81. See generally Emily Buss, Developing the Free Mind, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. EDUCATION LAW (Kristine Bowman ed., forthcoming 2020).
47. See Aaron Saiger, The Unintended Consequences of School Vouchers: Rise, Rout,
and Rebirth, in EDUCATIONAL POLICY GOES TO SCHOOL: CASE STUDIES ON THE LIMITATIONS
AND POSSIBILITIES OF EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION 125, 125–39 (Gilberto Q. Conchas et al. eds.,
2017).
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quality and shape of education to vary across social gaps in the United States,
above all the gap between rich and poor.48 If the schools in poor zip codes,
in distressed rural and urban areas, are wretched, and those in tony suburbs
fabulous, in what sense do we have “common” schooling?49 Many would
argue that the world today defined by American public schooling treats
schooling nearly as a purely private good,50 one bargained for in the
marketplace for real estate.51 On this view, commitments to “public”
schooling are just a thin patina, a pretext whose plausibility is preserved only
because we have unjustifiably joined the marketplace for school with the
marketplace for housing.
If schooling is understood as a private good, and public schools are known
to be in no way common, then it will be virtually impossible to seek to
preserve the common-school ethic. On the other hand, if public schools
could in fact become more “common” and less stratified, appreciation for
Progressive education might improve. Efforts like Zelman and Espinoza
have capitalized upon the low quality of the public options available to poor
parents, which makes them interested in religious schools and available to be
drafted as plaintiffs.52
2. Regulate. States routinely regulate industries that span the public and
private sectors by enacting generally applicable rules. The willingness to
regulate private education in this way has generally been low. This, I feel
sure, is because publicly provided education is “regulated” as a concomitant
feature of its production, while the large subsidy for public education has
suppressed demand for private alternatives. Absent the differential subsidy,
the state can realize some of the common-school vision by explicitly
demanding that private as well as public schools pursue it. Command and
control, without discrimination based upon religion, does not elicit First
Amendment objections.

48. See generally JAMES RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO
SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA (2011).
49. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 682 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he promise of public school education has failed poor inner-city blacks.
While in theory providing education to everyone, the quality of public schools varies
significantly across districts.”).
50. See Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in the Production
of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2001).
51. Jennifer Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools: School Choice and the
Social Construction of School Quality, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 177, 177–78 (2002); Saiger,
supra note 7, at 918.
52. Brief for Petitioners at 6, Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 18-1195 (U.S.
Sept. 11, 2019) (“Petitioners are all low-income mothers who were counting on the
scholarships to keep their children in . . . a nondenominational religious school . . . . Petitioner
Kendra Espinoza is a single mother who transferred her two daughters out of public school
after her youngest struggled in her classes and her oldest was teased and sometimes bullied by
her classmates.”); cf. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 677 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Besieged by
escalating financial problems and declining academic achievement, the Cleveland City School
District was in the midst of an academic emergency when Ohio enacted its scholarship
program.”).
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What could be regulated? Most obviously, curriculum, and civics
curriculum in particular. Many states are quite laissez-faire about this, but
they need not be. New York State is an outlier, with substantial curriculum
regulation and newly enacted (and controversial) provisions for strong
enforcement.53 (The wisdom of New York’s approach in a world where
differential subsidies persist can be questioned.) The old 1920s cases make
it clear that extensive curricular regulation like New York’s applied to private
schools is constitutional.54 Moreover, those cases strongly suggest that
regulation can include requirements of values education and with respect to
pedagogical methods.55
The other obvious area to consider for regulation is admissions and the
design of peer groups. Insisting upon nondiscrimination in schools is no
more problematic than doing so in places of employment; religious schools,
like religious employers, might be exempted with respect to religion but not
other categories. And discrimination could be defined to extend to
socioeconomic class and place of residence. Regulations could govern
individual classrooms as well as entire schools. Regulations could tackle the
disparate impact of admissions rules as well as facial discrimination.
The principle that the state cannot standardize children would stand. So
would the prohibition of too much entanglement of state regulators with
religious schools. But these kinds of regulation are not inconsistent with
those principles.
3. Double down on the market. If the Constitution were to be read to
require that students in nonpublic religious schools must receive public
subsidy on the same basis that students in public schools do, the values of
common schooling would best be served by insisting that parity should also
extend to nonpublic secular schools.56 This counterintuitive move would
limit the customer base for religious education, so that most parents signing
up for religious schooling would do so because they genuinely prefer it.
(This was emphatically not the case under the Ohio choice programs
approved in Zelman or the Montana program contested in Espinoza.) This
approach also recognizes that a rich, true diversity of schooling options

53. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204 (McKinney 2020). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS (2009), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/
regprivschl/regprivschl.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2RV-J6L2] (providing a fifty-state survey of
public regulation of private schools).
54. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). For an argument for this
proposition, see Aaron Saiger, State Regulation of Curriculum in Private Religious Schools:
A Constitutional Analysis, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND EDUCATION: A CASE STUDY OF
YESHIVAS VS. NEW YORK (Jason Bedrick, Jay P. Greene & Matthew H. Lee eds., forthcoming
2020).
55. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (“No question is raised concerning the power of the State
reasonably to regulate all schools . . . to require that . . . teachers shall be of good moral
character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship
must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.”).
56. Although such parity would be compelling policy, it is hard to argue that it is
constitutionally required.
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comes closer to providing a common experience than a marketplace
contaminated by differential subsidies that favor religion.
Differential subsidies that favor religion are in fact ubiquitous in the
current school-choice landscape. As I have argued in the past, the subsidies
associated with voucher and scholarship programs are too small actually to
make it possible for educational providers to observe demand in the market
for particular educational approaches and then to open schools designed to
meet that demand.57 A $150 scholarship or $2250 voucher is not enough to
cover the most basic of costs in a start-up venture. The result is that school
choice is limited to rich schools and schools with sources of funding other
than tuition. That latter category primarily consists of church schools. This
is a skewed marketplace that no one who actually embraces market-based
thinking in the educational sphere should tolerate. Only in a working market
does the full range of parental preferences about schooling find expression.
In that market, the parents who choose religious schools would almost always
be parents who actually prefer religious education. That is clearly not the
case now.
Would such a move find common cause with those now in the school
choice movement? I think so. If not, this would be evidence that the rhetoric
of choice really is primarily a pretext for diverting government money to
religious institutions. If that were the case, we should expect to see divisions
emerge within the pro-choice right. Libertarians and religious schools, many
of which promote religious values to which libertarianism is foreign, might
no longer make common cause. (Perhaps true libertarians, who object to
educational subsidy at any level, might accept a market skewed to religion
even without having a commitment to religion. But such people are almost
entirely absent from the current school-choice debate.)
It may be desirable for Progressive educators in our time to recast their
goals in a somewhat more pluralist way. Contemporary understanding of
American democracy, and in particular, of the goals of immigration and the
process of socializing immigrants into a new nation, do not demand the
“standardization” of students that so motivated the Progressives and that was
half-approved by the Pierce Court, with its talk of “patriotic disposition.”58
We no longer think that good education seeds all students, especially those
from other nations, with similar political ideas and reflexive respect for
political authority. That part of Progressivism no longer appeals.
The part that does is perhaps best served by a richly diverse, but strongly
regulated, set of schools that educate students with all sorts of different ideas
about what constitutes education for a good life. In that world, religion would
neither be a maligned stepchild nor have pride of place. Church schools
would offer some visions of schooling, among many others. All those views,
taken together, fixed by the joint operation of markets and regulatory
agencies, would constitute the (pluralist) vision of education for this
Republic. If that is the vision at the heart of Espinoza, those attuned to
57. Saiger, supra note 7, at 956–57.
58. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
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Progressive ideas need not feel that losing the case means the failure of their
cause.

